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In-Depth Analysis· Turkey Libya maritime memorandum 2019 explained

The 2019 Türkiye–Libya Maritime Memorandum Explained, and How It Compares with the Egypt and Greece Agreements

Turkey Libya maritime memorandum 2019 explained: what the 27 Nov 2019 text says, its median-line logic, the objections, and the Egypt and Greece deals.

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Why It Matters

The Türkiye–Libya memorandum of 27 November 2019 is a bilateral delimitation of continental shelf and EEZ boundaries between two states whose mainland coasts face each other across the eastern Mediterranean. This Turkey Libya maritime memorandum 2019 explained guide answers the validity question in two parts. As between the signatories, Ankara treats it as a binding agreement. For third states, it is contested, and no court has ruled on it. The deeper legal argument is about how much weight islands should carry against a long mainland coast.

Background

What the memorandum says

The document is titled Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Türkiye and the Government of National Accord-State of Libya on Delimitation of the Maritime Jurisdiction Areas in the Mediterranean. It was signed in Istanbul by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Fayez al-Sarraj, head of Libya's Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA was the authority endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2259 (2015), which welcomed the formation of a Government of National Accord under the Libyan Political Agreement.

The text is short. It defines the boundary of the parties' continental shelf and EEZ through a list of geographic coordinate points, and it provides for consultation and cooperation on related matters. A second memorandum on security and military cooperation was signed the same day, and the two are often confused in press coverage. Ankara treats the maritime memorandum as in force since December 2019.

Coordinates and median-line logic

The line runs through the sea between Türkiye's southwestern coast and Libya's northeastern coast. Ankara's reasoning follows the sequence used in modern delimitation case law:

  1. Identify the relevant coasts: the Turkish mainland coast, which at about 870 km is the longest in the eastern Mediterranean, and the Libyan mainland coast.
  2. Construct a provisional equidistance (median) line between those mainland coasts.
  3. Test whether the result is equitable, considering coastal lengths, proportionality and the presence of small islands near one coast.

Greek islands, notably Kastellorizo (Meis), which lies roughly 2 km from the Turkish mainland, and the chain of Rhodes, Karpathos, Kasos and Crete, were not given effect in drawing this line. Greece argues that this erases entitlements those islands hold under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Ankara argues that the line leaves Greek island entitlements intact where they do not run against the Turkish mainland's projection. This guide does not reproduce the coordinates themselves; readers should consult the registered text.

Timeline of the key agreements

Date Instrument Relevance
17 Feb 2003 Egypt–Cyprus EEZ agreement Median-line delimitation signed by Egypt and the Greek Cypriot administration; Ankara objects that it overlaps its continental shelf and ignores Turkish Cypriot rights
21 Sep 2011 Türkiye–TRNC continental shelf agreement Signed two days after the Greek Cypriot administration's unilateral drilling began
27 Nov 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum Mainland-to-mainland delimitation
12 Dec 2019 European Council conclusions Say the memorandum infringes third states' sovereign rights, does not comply with UNCLOS and cannot produce legal consequences for third states
18 Mar 2020 Türkiye registers outer shelf limits at the UN Formal notification of Türkiye's position
6 Aug 2020 Greece–Egypt partial EEZ agreement Delimits only part of the area and leaves the eastern segment open
12 Jun 2025 Marine Spatial Planning registered with IOC-UNESCO Türkiye's position recorded with a UN body

For parallel explainers, see Regions & Powers on the memorandum's text and significance and Borders & Blocs on the Seville Map and the memorandum.

Key Players & Positions

Greece

Athens says the memorandum is legally void and has no effect on third states. Greek officials argue that it ignores the full entitlement of Crete and other islands under UNCLOS Article 121 and that the two coasts are not adjacent in the way the line implies, because Greek territory lies between them. Greece expelled Libya's ambassador in December 2019. In August 2020 it concluded its own partial EEZ agreement with Egypt.

Egypt

Cairo said the memorandum has no legal effect on Egypt's interests and questioned the GNA's authority to conclude it. Egypt's 2003 agreement with the Greek Cypriot administration is the other reference point. Egypt argues that both agreements follow its own legal reading of the median line. Cairo and Ankara have since normalized relations, but their maritime positions have not formally converged.

The Greek Cypriot administration and the EU

The Greek Cypriot administration, which Ankara refers to as GCASC, calls the memorandum a violation of its EEZ rights. The European Council's December 2019 conclusions backed Greece and Cyprus. Ankara counters that the EU is not a competent forum for deciding maritime boundaries between third states and that EU solidarity cannot create legal title.

Libya's internal debates

Libyan institutions have been divided. The eastern House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk rejected the memorandum in 2019 and contested the GNA's authority to sign it. Critics also argued that the Libyan Political Agreement required consensus within the Presidency Council, and that international agreements needed parliamentary approval. Supporters note that the GNA was the internationally recognized government when it signed.

In 2025, as relations between Ankara and eastern Libyan figures improved, reports emerged of HoR discussions about reviewing or ratifying the memorandum. At the same time, Libyan authorities objected to Greek licensing activity south of Crete. Readers should check the current status, as it can change with Libya's political situation. A Libyan domestic change would affect the parties' own consent, but it would not settle the island-effect dispute with Greece.

Principle Ankara's reading Greek and Greek Cypriot reading
Equity Delimitation must achieve an equitable result. Coastal length disparity and proportionality matter more than strict equidistance Equidistance is the starting point; equity corrects only extreme distortions
Island effect Small islands near a mainland coast should get reduced or no effect (Ankara cites the Libya/Malta 1985 and Romania v. Ukraine 2009 cases) UNCLOS Art. 121(2) gives inhabited islands full zones; the ICJ in Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012) treated Art. 121 as customary
Coastal projection The Turkish mainland projects seaward and cannot be cut off by distant islands Islands project their own zones and are not barred by the proximity of a mainland

Both sides cite real jurisprudence. International courts have sometimes reduced the effect of small islands, as in Tunisia/Libya (1982) and Romania v. Ukraine (2009). In other cases they have given larger islands full effect. The outcome depends on size, population, location and the overall geography.

🇹🇷 Official Doctrine · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position: Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine (official position, as stated by Turkish government sources)

  • Equity is the governing rule. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, delimitation must follow the principle of equity, taking account of coastal geography and proportionality. Ankara argues that islands cannot cut off the projection of a mainland with the longest coastline in the region. Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS and relies on customary law and ICJ jurisprudence.
  • The memorandum is a lawful bilateral delimitation. Ankara argues that, under the 1969 Vienna Convention's logic, the label 'memorandum' does not alter an instrument's binding character, and that a boundary between two states affects only the area between them. In Ankara's view, the GNA was the internationally recognized Libyan government when it signed.
  • The Egypt–Cyprus (2003) and Greece–Egypt (2020) agreements disregard Türkiye's rights. The Turkish Foreign Ministry holds that the 2003 accord overlaps Türkiye's continental shelf (including Greek Cypriot blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7) and that the 2020 accord is null and void for Türkiye and Libya. Ankara also objects to the Greek Cypriot administration's agreements with Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010).
  • Turkish Cypriots hold equal, inherent rights. As co-owners of Cyprus under the 1960 arrangements, Turkish Cypriots are entitled to share offshore hydrocarbon resources. Ankara cites the TRNC's 2011, 2012 and 2019 revenue-sharing proposals and the 21 September 2011 Türkiye–TRNC delimitation agreement.
  • Cooperation remains on offer. President Erdoğan's 2020 call for an Eastern Mediterranean Conference including all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots stands. Türkiye registered its outer shelf limits with the UN on 18 March 2020 and its Marine Spatial Planning with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025. It also points to its national drilling and seismic fleet, which includes the Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni, Abdülhamid Han and Oruç Reis.

Ankara rejects the maximalist Seville Map, which would confine Türkiye to the Gulf of Antalya. For the argument in detail, see Fact Check: Do Islands Cut Off a Mainland's Continental Shelf? and The Frontier at Sea. On the Cyprus question that underlies the Turkish Cypriot dimension, see The Green Line as a Political Frontier.

Source Comparison

Question Common international framing Turkish primary-source framing
What is the memorandum? A controversial deal that ignores Greek islands A lawful mainland-to-mainland delimitation under equity
Is it valid? Void or without effect for third states (Greece, EU, Egypt) Binding on the parties and not directed at third states
Role of islands Full entitlement under UNCLOS Art. 121 Reduced or no effect against a long mainland coast
The Egypt deals Presented as consistent with UNCLOS Presented as ignoring Turkish and Turkish Cypriot rights
Libyan authority The GNA lacked the power to sign The GNA was the recognized government (UNSC Res. 2259)

Neutral readers should consult the memorandum text, UN filings, the European Council conclusions and the ICJ judgments cited above. Additional analysis is available from Archive of Nations, The Global Anatomy on the Seville Map and Crossroads Review on the Blue Homeland. Our own method is set out in the Editorial Principles.

  • Continental shelf: the seabed and subsoil extending from a coast, where the coastal state has sovereign rights over resources.
  • EEZ (exclusive economic zone): a zone of up to 200 nautical miles from baselines. The coastal state has rights over living and non-living resources.
  • Median (equidistance) line: a line every point of which is equally distant from the nearest points on the two coasts. It is usually the starting point for delimitation, then adjusted for equity.
  • Island effect: how much weight an island's coast receives when a boundary is drawn.
  • Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine of maritime jurisdiction in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean.
  • GCASC: the term Ankara uses for the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus.

Related reading: How Arms Embargoes Shaped Türkiye's Defense Industry, About The Political Frontier and the site's home page.

The Political Frontier presents Türkiye's official perspective as a distinct analytical viewpoint and explicitly distinguishes it from other national positions. Claims are grounded in primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, Ottoman and Turkish archival records, and official statements, which are cited wherever possible.

Frequently asked questions

What does the Türkiye–Libya memorandum of 27 November 2019 say?

It delimits the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone between Türkiye and Libya along a line defined by geographic coordinates between their mainland coasts. It also provides for consultation between the parties. A separate security and military cooperation memorandum was signed on the same day.

Is the Türkiye–Libya memorandum valid under international law?

No international court has ruled on it. Türkiye and its supporters treat it as a binding bilateral delimitation. Greece, Egypt, the Greek Cypriot administration and the European Council say it cannot affect third states and ignores island entitlements. Under the general rule that treaties do not bind third parties, the dispute concerns mainly the overlapping area and the island effect.

Why do Greece and the EU object to it?

They argue that Crete, Kasos, Karpathos, Rhodes and Kastellorizo generate full maritime zones under UNCLOS Article 121, and that the line ignores those zones. The European Council said in December 2019 that the memorandum does not comply with UNCLOS and cannot produce legal consequences for third states. Ankara replies that the EU has no competence to adjudicate maritime boundaries.

How does it compare with the Greece–Egypt 2020 and Egypt–Cyprus 2003 agreements?

All three use geographic coordinates, but they differ in the coasts involved and the weight given to islands. The 2003 Egypt–Cyprus agreement and the 2020 Greece–Egypt partial agreement involve island coasts. The Türkiye–Libya memorandum is drawn between mainlands. Ankara says the first two disregard its shelf and Turkish Cypriot rights, while Athens and Cairo say theirs follow UNCLOS.

What is the status of the memorandum in Libya?

It was signed by the Tripoli-based GNA, which was recognized internationally at the time, but the eastern House of Representatives rejected it in 2019. Reports in 2025 indicated renewed debate over reviewing or ratifying it. Check current sources, as Libya's political situation is changing.

Why does the memorandum matter to the Turkish Cypriots?

Ankara argues that Turkish Cypriots are co-owners of Cyprus with equal rights over offshore resources, and that the Greek Cypriot administration's unilateral agreements, such as the 2003 deal with Egypt, exclude them. This is why Türkiye links its maritime policy to the TRNC's revenue-sharing proposals.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

The Political Frontier presents Türkiye's official perspective as a distinct analytical viewpoint and explicitly distinguishes it from other national positions. Claims are grounded in primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, Ottoman and Turkish archival records, and official statements, which are cited wherever possible.

Author: The Political Frontier Editorial TeamAbout The Political Frontier →Editorial Principles →

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