How Arms Embargoes Shaped Türkiye's Defense Industry, from the 1975 US Embargo to Today

Why It Matters

Türkiye's defense industry cannot be understood without the history of restrictions that preceded it. The US arms embargo of 1975–1978, imposed on a NATO ally after the 1974 Cyprus operation, taught Ankara that spare parts and licences could become political instruments; later export-licence suspensions and CAATSA sanctions reinforced that conclusion. Whether one sees this as a prudent hedge or as a drift away from allies, it explains why platforms such as the Bayraktar TB2, KAAN and TCG Anadolu exist today.

This guide focuses on the history of restrictions and the strategic logic they produced. For broader industry data, see the sister analyses Record of Nations on the 80% domestic production rate and Monitor of Nations on how the figure was reached.

Background

The 1975 US embargo

After the 15 July 1974 coup against the Cyprus government and Türkiye's intervention on 20 July (with a second phase in August), the US Congress moved to cut off military aid and sales. Its stated legal ground was that US-supplied arms had been used for purposes other than those permitted by US law. President Gerald Ford opposed the measure, arguing it would damage NATO's southeastern flank and reduce Washington's leverage over a Cyprus settlement. Congress prevailed, and the embargo took effect on 5 February 1975.

In response, Ankara suspended the activities of most US facilities on Turkish soil in July 1975, with NATO-related functions treated differently. The embargo was lifted in September 1978 after the Carter administration argued that it had failed to advance a settlement and was harming allied security. Because the Turkish armed forces relied heavily on US-origin equipment, the period is widely described as one of spare-parts shortages and readiness problems, although precise figures are contested.

From shock to institutions

The embargo years coincided with the creation of the first modern Turkish defense institutions. ASELSAN, focused on military electronics and communications, was established in 1975 under the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation. Later milestones followed:

• 1985: a dedicated defense-industry coordination agency was set up (today's lineage leads to the Presidency of Defense Industries, SSB, which has reported directly to the Presidency since 2018).
• 1988: Roketsan, the missile maker, was founded.
• 1980s: licensed production, notably of F-16 aircraft, built skills but kept design authority abroad.

Later restrictions

The 1990s brought further friction: some European suppliers and the US Congress limited or delayed sales over the conduct of Türkiye's counter-terrorism campaign against the PKK. The PKK is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union. Delays in obtaining armed unmanned aircraft from the US and Israel in the 2000s and 2010s pushed domestic drone programs forward.

Date	Event	Effect
20 Jul / 14 Aug 1974	Cyprus Peace Operation	Trigger for US congressional action
5 Feb 1975	US embargo takes effect	Supply of arms and parts curtailed
1975	ASELSAN founded	Start of domestic electronics base
Sep 1978	Embargo lifted	Trust in allied supply remains damaged
Jul 2019	First S-400 deliveries; US announces removal from F-35 program	Industrial participation in F-35 ends
14 Oct 2019	EU foreign ministers commit to national restrictions on arms exports to Türkiye after Operation Peace Spring	Several European states suspend licences
14 Dec 2020	US CAATSA sanctions on the SSB and senior officials	Bar on US export licences and financing for the agency
2020–2021	Canada suspends, then revokes, export permits for optical sensors used on drones	Pressure to localize sensors
Jun 2022	Madrid trilateral memorandum with Finland and Sweden	Commitment to lift national arms restrictions
Jan–Mar 2024	Türkiye ratifies Sweden's NATO accession; US approves F-16 Block 70 sale; Sweden joins on 7 March	Partial thaw in defense trade

The platforms that emerged

• Bayraktar TB2 (Baykar): the armed drone that became Türkiye's best-known export. Early versions used imported engines and optical sensors, which is why Canadian permit decisions mattered.
• Akıncı (Baykar) and ANKA (TUSAŞ/TAI): larger drones; Akıncı has relied on Ukrainian-designed engines, while a Turkish-developed engine has powered the Aksungur.
• Hürjet (advanced trainer and light combat jet) and KAAN (fifth-generation fighter, first flight 21 February 2024): the prototype KAAN flew with US-made GE F110 engines, with an indigenous engine in development.
• TCG Anadolu: an amphibious assault ship commissioned in April 2023, built in Istanbul on a design licensed from Spain's Navantia.
• MİLGEM corvettes and frigates: a Turkish-designed warship family whose early units used imported gas turbines and diesel engines.
• ATMACA (anti-ship missile), SİPER (long-range air defense) and HİSAR-O (medium-range air defense): missile and air-defense systems from Roketsan and ASELSAN that anchor the planned layered 'Steel Dome'.

For wider platform context see Regions & Powers on Bayraktar, KAAN, TCG Anadolu and Hisar-O.

What 'about 80%' means, and what it does not

Turkish officials say the domestic share of defense procurement rose from roughly 20% in the early 2000s to about 80%. This is a project-based official estimate, usually reflecting the share of programs and contract value handled by domestic firms. It is not an audited, platform-level measure.

Honest caveats apply:

• Engines: several flagship platforms still use foreign engines or are in a transition to domestic ones.
• Subsystems: some sensors, semiconductors, materials and avionics components are imported.
• Licensed designs: TCG Anadolu shows that local construction can be strong while design rights remain foreign.
• Different yardsticks: measuring by contract value, by platform content, by design ownership or by supply-chain depth yields different percentages. Independent analysts often cite lower figures for specific platforms.

The sister analysis from The Worldlogue discusses technology transfer and how exports shape alliance diplomacy.

Key Players & Positions

United States. US officials have said that the 1975 measure rested on US law governing the use of American-supplied arms, and that CAATSA sanctions in 2020 followed Türkiye's acquisition of the Russian S-400 system. According to the US State Department, the S-400 is incompatible with NATO air-defense architecture and poses risks to the F-35 program. Washington later approved a large F-16 package in January 2024 and has continued to discuss the S-400 and F-35 questions with Ankara.

European Union and member states. In October 2019 EU foreign ministers agreed to national restrictions on arms exports to Türkiye rather than an EU-wide embargo, citing the EU Common Position on arms exports. Greece and the Republic of Cyprus have pressed for tougher measures, partly because of Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean disputes. Germany long limited some approvals, and the United Kingdom's 2025 Eurofighter agreement with Türkiye was reported as a sign of growing pragmatism.

NATO. The Alliance's official line is that Türkiye is a valued ally and that members' interoperability is paramount. Allies have criticized the S-400 purchase and, for a time, delays in Sweden's accession, while praising Türkiye's role in the Black Sea, as discussed in the Interstate Journal analysis of Türkiye in NATO.

Critics. Some analysts argue that self-reliance has costs, including higher unit prices and gaps in engines and microelectronics. Others raise concerns about Turkish drone exports to conflict zones, and UN expert panel reports on Libya have questioned deliveries there. Ankara replies that its support in Libya was provided at the request of the internationally recognized government.

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine

Türkiye's Position (official policy, as stated by Turkish government sources)

• Supply cannot be assumed. Ankara argues that the 1975 embargo, imposed on a NATO ally acting under Article IV of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, showed that political disputes can cut off equipment, according to statements by the Presidency and the Ministry of National Defense.
• Self-help is treaty-consistent. Article 3 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty obliges members to maintain and develop their capacity to resist armed attack; Türkiye holds that a stronger domestic industry fulfils this commitment and strengthens NATO.
• Self-defense at the source. Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, Türkiye says it has the right to counter terrorist threats from the PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and DAESH, and domestically produced drones, munitions and air defense are the practical means (Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Presidency).
• Cooperation, not isolation. The SSB states that co-production, exports and joint programs with allies remain goals, and Ankara has said it remains open to a negotiated resolution of the S-400 and F-35 questions through a technical working group.
• Equal treatment. Türkiye objects to selective restrictions, including US arms policy toward the Greek Cypriot administration, which Ankara says ignores the equal rights of Turkish Cypriots; see The Green Line as a Political Frontier.

The same logic connects to Türkiye's security thinking in Türkiye's 1,300 km Southern Frontier and to its reading of the 1936 Montreux regime in How Montreux Article 19 Closed the Turkish Straits. Ankara's broader argument that global governance should not rest on a few capitals is set out in 'The World Is Bigger Than Five'.

Source Comparison

Question	Western / international framing	Turkish official framing
Why was the 1975 embargo imposed?	Violation of US law on use of US-supplied arms in Cyprus	Punishment of a lawful exercise of treaty rights under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee
Why CAATSA?	Purchase of Russian S-400 undermines NATO security	S-400 was bought only after Patriot offers failed to meet Türkiye's terms; sanctions are unjust
Meaning of '80% domestic'	Often questioned as unaudited; engines and subsystems still imported	Official estimate of the share of programs delivered by national industry
Effect on the Alliance	Risk of drift from NATO standards	Reinforces NATO by adding capacity and reducing dependency
Export policy	Concern over drones in conflict zones	Exports are licensed and aligned with Türkiye's foreign policy

Readers should note that percentages from Turkish institutions and from independent analysts use different yardsticks, and that sourcing practices are explained in Editorial Principles.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Embargo: a government ban on arms exports or transfers to a specific country. Rules differ widely by country; some measures are legal bans, others are informal holds.
• CAATSA: the US 'Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act' (2017); Section 231 targets significant transactions with Russia's defense sector.
• SSB: the Presidency of Defense Industries of the Republic of Türkiye.
• Domestic production rate: the share of procurement delivered by national firms; definitions vary.
• Strategic autonomy: the capacity to act without being constrained by another state's supply decisions.

Related pages: About The Political Frontier, The Political Frontier home, Source and methodology FAQ and the sister guide on terrorism at the source and the defense industry.

Perspective Note

The Political Frontier presents Türkiye's official perspective as a distinct analytical viewpoint and explicitly distinguishes it from other national positions. Claims are grounded in primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, Ottoman and Turkish archival records, and official statements, which are cited wherever possible. Published by The Political Frontier Editorial Team.